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Monetary or fiscal stimulus can help only if unemployment is
cyclical; otherwise, if unemployment is structural
expansionary policies will lead only to inflation. Careful
recent analyses indicate that unemployment is mainly
cyclical in the US
Ethan Ilzetzki and Jonathan Pinder examine the US economic woes since the beginning
of the recession and the policy response aimed at fighting unemployment. They find that
monetary or fiscal stimulus can help only if unemployment is cyclical and that unemployment
(now at 7.8%) is indeed mainly cyclical. The examination of the US experience provides
valuable insight for the UK experience, currently undergoing a tough austerity programme
with an unemployment rate hovering at 7.9%.
The US is still suf f ering f rom its most severe recession in seven decades. During the recession
(of f icially dated f rom December 2007 to June 2009 by the National Bureau of  Economic Research,
NBER), the economy contracted by 5% and the stock market lost around half  its value. President Obama
cannot be blamed f or the recession itself , but Republicans do blame him f or the weak economic recovery
(see Figure 1).
Job creation has lagged behind the growth of  the workf orce so that unemployment remains high (see
Figure 2). Joblessness rose f rom 4.4% in 2006 to a peak of  10% in October 2009 and is currently 7.8%.
This actually understates the weakness of  the labour market as participation has declined. Compared
with previous post-war recessions, the employment rate has hardly recovered in this recession (see
Figure 3).
To add to these economic woes, house prices are still f alling, two-thirds f ewer new homes are being built
than bef ore the crisis and mortgage delinquencies are above 10%. The only good news is that US GDP
perf ormance is better than many other industrialised countries (the eurozone, Japan and the UK) and
better than the 1929 collapse. But this is a low benchmark f or the world’s largest economy to aim f or.
…but it  would have been much worse without the aggressive policy response
Monetary policy
The Fed’s response to the crisis was unprecedented in its magnitude and speed. Interest rates have
been cut to under 0.25%. Starting in 2009, the Fed embarked on large-scale quantitative easing (QE1),
purchasing more than a trillion dollars in private sector assets. In addition to QE1, in late 2012, the Fed
purchased long-term Treasury bonds in an attempt to bring down longer-term interest rates (QE2),
swapped short- term Treasury bills f or longer-term bonds starting in September 2011 (‘operation twist’)
and recently announced its intention to purchase $40 billion per month in mortgage-backed securit ies.
Although these policies have boosted the money supply, the money itself  has mainly remained as
reserves in private banks. The potential impact has been on longer-term and market-based rates beyond
those directly controlled by the Fed.
Republicans, including their presidential candidate Governor Mitt Romney, have crit icised the Fed’s
expansionary policies f or risking inf lation. The Fed’s chairman, Ben Bernanke, has justif ied the moves by
pointing to consistently low inf lation, low US sovereign debt yields and the need to restore growth.
Fiscal policy
Days af ter his inauguration, President Obama passed a ‘stimulus bill’ (the American Recovery and
Reconstruction Act), which was worth $787 billion, including tax cuts, aid to states and f ederal spending.
The majority view is that the stimulus kept unemployment lower than it would otherwise have been. For
example, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Of f ice (CBO) estimated that the stimulus added an
extra 0.9 to 4.7 million f ull- t ime jobs in 2010 (f or f urther evidence, see Wilson (2011) and the ref erences
therein). The ef f ect may have been higher than in normal t imes because interest rates were at the ‘zero
lower bound’ (Christiano et al, 2011); and because the relatively closed US economy was severely
depressed (f iscal policy is more potent in recessions).[1]
There remain sceptics (f or example, Barro and Redlick, 2011), including those who advance the notion of
expansionary f iscal contractions (f or example, Alesina and Ardagna, 2012). But evidence f rom the IMF
(2010) and others suggests that f iscal austerity is unlikely to lead to export- led growth if  the other
countries are also experiencing a severe contraction.
Whatever the views on the merits of  the stimulus, it was rather small in scale. President Obama chose
not to push f or a larger stimulus and was unable to enact his desired ‘second stimulus’ through a hostile
Congress in 2011.
Although f ederal government purchases increased signif icantly in 2008-10 (growing by 14% in real terms
– see Figure 4), their increase was not unusually large. For example, the increase in public expenditures in
the mid-2000s, arising f rom the wars in Af ghanistan and Iraq, was larger. And while f ederal purchases
increased signif icantly in the f irst two years of  the crisis, they have since decelerated and are currently
declining at a f aster rate than any time in the past decade.
Overall across all levels of  government, public purchases increased to a smaller extent in the early part
of  the recession (growing by only 5% in 2008-10). Federal expenditures in part f illed the gap opened up
by states and municipalit ies, where public spending has declined, bound by rules on having balanced
budgets.
Is high unemployment structural?
Monetary or f iscal stimulus can help only if  unemployment is cyclical; otherwise, if  unemployment is
structural because of  skills or geographical mismatches between jobs and vacancies, expansionary
policies will lead only to inf lation. Even prior to the crisis, jobs growth lagged behind population growth
over the period 2000-07 (see Figure 5), possibly f or reasons related to demographic shif ts, healthcare
costs and inadequate skills.[2] Nevertheless, the depth of  job f alls in the recession is too large to be
explained by this secular decline. Caref ul recent analyses indicate that unemployment is mainly cyclical:
US unemployment is normal f or the particularly severe recession it is experiencing.[3]
This is the f irst part of two of the Centre for Economic Performance’s (CEP) US election
analysis on Recession and Recovery: The US Policy Debate on Taxes, Spending and Public Debt.
All of the papers in the series can be accessed here.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor
of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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[1] See Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a, b) and Ilzetzki et al (2012). For an application to the ef f ects
of  UK’s f iscal contraction see Bagaria et al (2012).
[2] Aaronson et al (2012) suggest that demographic patterns explain this pattern. Krueger (2011)
compares the US with Canada to show that high employer health care costs are a large part of  the
explanation.
[3] See Lazear and Spletzer (2012); Daly et al (2012) f ind that the natural rate of  unemployment has risen
slightly to 5%, well below the current level of  7.8%.
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You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. The UK needs monetary policy to be as expansionary as possible and this isn’t going to happen
under the current system (40.3)
2. 5 minutes with Steve Keen: “The better of  two bad policies is the stimulus approach” (37.4)
3. Given the enormity of  the short-  and long-run f iscal challenges f acing the US, the lack of  policy
detail f rom both presidential candidates is disappointing (23.7)
4. Northern prosperity will increase national prosperity but a comprehensive economic strategy is
needed to address structural constraints (21.9)
